Cookies help us run our site more efficiently.

By clicking “Accept”, you agree to the storing of cookies on your device to enhance site navigation, analyze site usage, and assist in our marketing efforts. View our Privacy Policy for more information or to customize your cookie preferences.

Trump appointees barred EPA staff from warning Senate about 'forever chemical' loophole: Internal staff messages

News Feed
Tuesday, April 9, 2024

Trump administration officials barred experts from warning legislators that they were about to write a major environmental loophole into law, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staffers alleged in newly revealed internal communications.   The loophole, arising from a clause in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), enabled many companies to avoid disclosing releases of toxic “forever chemicals” to the EPA.  Internal EPA correspondence obtained by The Hill shows that career staff members attempted to make Congress aware of the issue, but they believe their efforts were rebuffed by political appointees.  One employee lamented that career staff “had tried to tell” the Senate about the problem, but he could not get approval to do so.    The clause at issue, written by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (SEPW), said on Jan. 1, 2020, some of the chemicals — also known as PFAS — must be included in the EPA’s reporting database for toxic chemical releases: the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).    But while the clause specified an annual reporting threshold for the compounds, it did not indicate whether Congress intended to deem them “chemicals of special concern,” as opposed to the baseline “standard chemical” label.    Without the stricter designation, polluters could hide their discharges under an exemption intended for chemicals released in small proportions, called “de minimis” concentrations.  Some EPA experts wanted to point this out to Senate staffers but said they were blocked from doing so.   In August 2019, EPA career official David Turk wrote that his team "noticed some nuances that we had not considered previously that might be worth raising to [Senate] staff."  Turk, head of the data-gathering and analysis division within the EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics (OPPT), expressed concern that under the NDAA as drafted, companies would be able to get out of reporting their PFAS discharges if they only made up a small percentage of the total discharge.   "Note that in contacting SEPW staff, we do not plan to take a position on this issue, but rather would like to convey a consideration that we had failed to raise previously," Turk wrote.  His colleague Daniel Bushman, who at the time served as TRI petitions coordinator and chemical list manager, added that "the fix could be as simple as the bill just saying to add PFAS to the list of chemicals of special concern with a 100 pound reporting threshold."  Known for their persistence in the body and the environment, PFAS, or per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, have been linked to cancers and other serious illnesses. They are present in household items such as nonstick pans, cosmetics and waterproof apparel, and in certain types of firefighting foam.  With no direction otherwise from the NDAA, the EPA’s toxics branch codified 172 types of PFAS as standard chemicals and thereby opened the reporting loophole — publishing an initial version of the rule in May 2020 and finalizing it a month later.   Under this classification, if levels of PFOA, a particularly toxic type of PFAS, constituted less than 0.1 percent of a given mixture, or if those of the other 171 kinds of the toxic compounds were below 1 percent, sites would be exempt from disclosing their discharge. Given that even unsafe levels of PFAS generally occur in comparatively tiny quantities, the classification meant that hardly any facilities would need to file a report.   Bureaucratic breakdown  EPA experts from the Toxics Release Inventory Program had recognized the problem nearly a year before — but found themselves talking to a brick wall built by the Trump administration, according to the internal correspondence.   The experts recalled trying to inform the Senate committee that the language they were incorporating would not likely lead to stricter PFAS release reporting.   But these messages apparently never reached their intended recipients.  “Starting in late July 2019 we became aware of this issue and tried to raise it with Michal on multiple occasions,” Turk wrote in a June 10, 2020, email chain.  Turk was referring to Michal Freedhoff, who at the time served as minority director of oversight — a Democratic staffer — for the Senate committee.   That same day in 2020, Turk made similar remarks to another colleague, Stephanie Griffin, noting that "SEPW staff is pissed that we didn’t tell them about the whole chemicals of special concern issue.”   "We had tried to tell them,” he continued. "It’s all very awkward.”  Asked by Griffin where the breakdown in communication occurred, Turk said that it was “initially, Mark Hartman. And then Nancy Beck.”   Mark Hartman, the OPPT’s deputy director of programs, is a career official. Nancy Beck was a Trump appointee who served as deputy and then principal deputy assistant administrator of the EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention (OCSPP), which houses the OPPT. Prior to taking on the EPA role, Beck worked for five years as an executive at the American Chemistry Council, a chemical industry lobbying group.      In his exchange with Griffin, Turk then recounted a situation in which he and his colleagues were blocked from sharing the issue with the Senate committee.  “Then we finally did get approval to include it in materials to send to Nancy that she might then send to SEPW, which we knew she wouldn’t send to them,” Turk added.  The “awkwardness” Turk referred to stemmed from an email sent earlier that day from Freedhoff to Sven-Erik Kaiser of the EPA’s Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations, expressing shock that the May prepublication labeled PFAS as standard chemicals. The designation, she noted, could make PFAS “eligible for the de minimis concentration exemption.”  “To get around TRI reporting for a listed PFAS chemical, all one would need to do is dilute the 100 lbs in 10,000 lbs of something else,” Freedhoff wrote. “This is not what Congress intended — we intended for reporting to occur for all releases that exceeded 100 lbs.”  She stressed that the purpose of the NDAA clause “was certainly NOT to allow an entity to avoid reporting in the first place.”    A significant portion of the June 11 communications among Turk and his colleagues were redacted under Freedom of Information Act procedures. But one visible portion affirmed Freedhoff’s assertions that EPA staffers never warned her that the NDAA language could prevent PFAS from being listed as chemicals of special concern.   “We did not have direct interactions with Michal and did not control the delivery of information to Michal,” Turk added. “It appears that our messages on the topic never did reach her.”   Slipping through the cracks  Correspondence from 2019 shows that career EPA staffers made multiple attempts to warn Freedhoff about the loophole.  Kaiser, a career official at the agency, initially expressed confidence to her that the clause would do what lawmakers wanted. In a June 17, 2019, email to Kaiser about the clause in question, Freedhoff asked whether "this does what it needs to do." Kaiser responded that the EPA believed the "language achieves the drafters' intent."   But less than a month later — on July 10, 2019 — Bushman, the TRI petition coordinator, noted that the draft "does not classify PFAS as chemicals of special concern.”   Bushman expressed concern that facilities would be able to claim that they stayed below the annual reporting thresholds, which he said “defeats the idea of having 100 lb reporting threshold to capture small quantities."   Turk echoed Bushman's comments, also noting on July 10, 2019, that the reporting loophole "would put a [serious] damper on the utility of the TRI data."  A few weeks later, on Aug. 6, Turk wrote to several staff members and Hartman, the OPPT’s deputy director of programs, warning that under the NDAA draft as written, companies would be able to “use the de minimis exemption, which could result in the loss of reporting."   Turk expressed similar unease on Sept. 12, 2019, alerting Kaiser that the TRI/OPPT team had generated technical assistance "when Nancy reached out for info," but that "it was unclear" whether the EPA was "also providing that document to SEPW staff."   Turk asked Kaiser if it "would be inappropriate to share” the special concern details with Freedhoff. Kaiser said he would "see if there's an opportunity,” but that he thought they had previously raised the matter and that Senate staff “weren't in position to address it at the time."  Turk emphasized that he had only recognized this "nuance" recently — meaning that if his message was not conveyed alongside the technical data Beck had requested, then EPA staff would have "never raised it" to SEPW, as they "wouldn't have known to do so."  A week later, on Sept. 19, Turk once again informed his colleagues that he was uncertain as to whether the EPA team ever delivered the message to SEPW.   "I believe it went to Nancy Beck, but I don't know if it went to SEPW," Turk said.   To this, longtime career staffer Tala Henry, then deputy director of OPPT, responded, "I don't think we can raise other issues," adding that this "specific request is late in the game."  Asked by email why she might have deemed the request "too late in the game," Henry, who no longer works at the EPA, stressed that she had not reviewed the correspondence, which was available due to a Freedom of Information Act request.   But based on her memory of the internal EPA exchanges, she said she recalled that "the TRI team had already provided the technical assistance requested by SEPW."   This process, Henry continued, occurred "with all requisite clearance by EPA Office of General Counsel and political leadership and coordination clearance through EPAs Office of Congressional Affairs."  "The legislation (part of the NDAA) was imminent," she added.  An outcome ‘of maximum awkwardness’  Nine months after the September 2019 internal EPA communications, in June 2020, it became clear Freedhoff and her SEPW team had never received the information about the loophole that agency staffers had tried to convey.   On June 9, Turk reported in an email to his colleagues that he had done "a little researching of [his] inbox" and indicated his concern that the career staffers' message had not been relayed to the committee, despite Kaiser recalling in a past exchange with Turk that it had been.  “I don’t believe that we had yet presented this topic to him as something to share with SEPW, for at the OPPT or OCSPP level it kept getting stripped,” Turk wrote.   By this time, the EPA had issued its rule codifying PFAS as a standard chemical.   In Freedhoff’s June 10 email expressing shock about the classification, originally sent to Kaiser, she asked whether the EPA could withdraw the rule prior to its official publication and launch a notice and comment process to allow her colleagues “to describe their intent in writing.”  As the email spread among EPA staffers that day, Turk told Griffin, an OPPT team lead, that Freedhoff had asked “to pull the final rule because it doesn’t reflect their intent.”   Reiterating how he and his team had anticipated this outcome the summer before, Turk stressed that they “had discussed that SEPW would be upset when they learned that we didn’t tell them of this issue, which was one of the reasons we had tried to tell them of it.”  At around the same time, Turk told Bushman, the TRI petition coordinator, that he was “not looking forward to the ‘discussion’ with Michal.”   “It’s not like we can be open/honest with her given that we had wanted to convey all of this to her but we hadn’t been able to do so,” he continued. “‘You got it wrong, we realized that you got it wrong, and we never told you,’ also isn’t a viable discussion.”  “I suppose we can point to Nancy Beck. But, even that, seems fishy,” Turk added.   Bushman agreed, though he said he was reluctant “to take the heat for management’s unwillingness to let them know that what they were writing was not going to get them what they wanted.”   But he surmised that nothing could be done about the situation at the time, adding that “if the Admin changes then next year we could likely address it.”  Asked about the accusations lodged against her by the EPA staffers, Beck, who is today director of regulatory science at the law firm Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, said that she did not have time to delve into all the correspondence.   Beck noted, however, that in January 2019, Alexandra Dunn became the Senate-confirmed assistant administrator of the OCSPP — the position directly above her.   “She was the decision maker, not me,” Beck wrote in an email, adding that she “went on a detail” to the National Economic Council in June 2019. “Perhaps Alex has a recollection of this issue and can discuss it with you.”  The Hill has reached out to Dunn, who is now the president and CEO of agrochemicals group CropLife America, for comment.  As Turk and Bushman wrote back and forth on that June 10, 2020, evening, the former suggested how interesting it would be “if the admin changes and Michal joins the EPA,” predicting “the most ridiculous outcome in terms of maximum awkwardness.”  Whether Turk was joking or serious, this is at least in part what happened. Freedhoff assumed Beck’s former role in January 2021 and received Senate confirmation to lead the OCSPP later that year.    A reversal — and a ‘re-reversal’  Two days after Turk and Bushman’s June 10 banter, it became clear in the email correspondence that the TRI Program Division was preparing for a potential about-face — to possibly list the 172 PFAS as chemicals of special concern.    “At this point, it appears that the NDAA listing rule will now indicate that the NDAA-added PFAS will be listed as ‘chemicals of special concern,’” Turk wrote to colleagues on the morning of Friday, June 12, warning that they “are not notifying anyone of this change.”   But just three days later, on Monday, Turk said he was “not sure what’s happening,” adding that his team was “in a momentary holding pattern.” And by Wednesday, Turk wrote that “the rule is going out as originally intended, in alignment with the prepublication version.”   Responding to what Turk described as a “re-reversal,” Bushman voiced suspicions that this was "due to conversation with the administrator and possibly some feedback from industry if someone reached out.”   The team reverted back to the prepublication version of the rule, finalizing the text on June 22, 2020, and leaving the 172 PFAS, for the time being, in the standard chemical category.   In the hands of ‘political leadership’   Freedhoff, Turk and Bushman ended up being correct in their projections that the June 2020 standard chemical listing would lead to minimal PFAS reporting.    In the aftermath of the rule’s implementation, the EPA revealed that during the first year of reporting — for 2020 — the nation’s facilities managed 800,000 pounds of PFAS in 2020 but only disclosed 9,000 pounds as releases.  Following the transition from a Trump to Biden administration and with Freedhoff at the helm, the OCSPP and OPPT did ultimately decide to categorize 189 types of PFAS as chemicals of special concern more than two years after the loophole was opened.   The agency proposed the new rule in December 2022 and finalized it in October 2023 — scrapping the de minimis exemption and making it much harder to avoid reporting releases.   While the stricter designation will apply to submissions in reporting year 2024, industry can follow the standard chemical rules for their 2023 filings, which are due by July 1, 2024, according to the EPA.  Environmental advocates worry the shift will be too little, too late.    Nathan Saunders, a Maine environmental health official who first urged The Hill to look into the correspondence, stressed just how damaging the postponement could be for communities affected by PFAS.  “The whole U.S. population was delayed from knowing PFAS release for four years,” said Saunders, who manages the Radiation Control Program in Maine’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention and delved into the issue after massive amounts of PFAS were detected on his property.   Saunders blamed the setback on what he described as a “conscious identification of PFAS chemicals as standard chemicals.”   That conscious decision, he added, occurred “at the expense of public health and to the benefit of the corporate profits."  Responding to a long list of questions about the internal haggling that informed TRI-related decisions, EPA press secretary Remmington Belford said in an emailed statement that Freedhoff, in her prior role at the SEPW, had “worked closely with EPA career staff” as her committee drafted the clause that would add the 100-pound reporting threshold.   Noting that the threshold was discussed on multiple occasions, Belford stressed that “at no time before the law was enacted” was Freedhoff told that lowering the threshold would be insufficient to eliminate the de minimis exemption — and would therefore not ensure “that the transparency objectives of the legislation would be met.”  Once she understood the truth, Freedhoff “did attempt to get EPA to change course,” according to Belford. After the law was enacted, she learned from EPA career staff “that political leadership in the previous administration did not allow [them] to present Congress with additional technical assistance” that would have explained the de minimis issue, he added.   Belford did acknowledge, however, that there was some initial confusion among EPA staff members. The confusion arose from the fact that to date, the only TRI chemicals assigned such thresholds were those in the “special concern” umbrella, he noted.    “Certain EPA career staff members wanted to clarify for Senate staff that if their intent was to designate the TRI-added PFAS as ‘chemicals of special concern,’ the text as written would not accomplish this intent,” Beck confirmed.   Asked specifically whether Beck or Hartman — who still works at the EPA — was responsible for blocking the message, Belford responded that “some of the people involved with the technical assistance for the 2020 NDAA are no longer with the agency.”  The understanding of OCSPP career managers, Belford explained, is that “the previous administration’s political appointees opted not to share” information about the exemption with SEPW staff.  “This understanding is consistent with what Dr. Freedhoff was told at the time by EPA career staff — this decision was not made by EPA career staff or managers,” he continued.   “EPA, like all federal agencies, includes both career civil servants hired through a competitive process and political appointees appointed by the President,” Belford said. “Ultimately, EPA career staff members (including senior career managers) are led by political appointees and are obligated to follow the direction they are provided.”  Asked if industry interests influenced the chemicals’ standard designation, as Bushman suggested in internal correspondence, Belford said that “industry did not contact career staff working in EPA’s TRI program to lobby, pressure or express their preferences regarding the text of the 2020 NDAA or its implementation.”   “EPA is not aware of whether industry contacted the political leadership of the agency that was in place at that time,” he added, reiterating that “EPA career staff are required to follow the direction of the political leadership.”  Once President Biden took office, Belford said “it was an immediate priority” for both the administration and EPA career staff to designate the TRI-listed PFAS as chemicals of special concern — a decision he in part attributed to Freedhoff, who joined the OCSPP in January 2021.  “In Dr. Freedhoff’s view, this was always the intent of Congress in passing the NDAA,” Belford added. 

Trump administration officials barred experts from warning legislators that they were about to write a major environmental loophole into law, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staffers alleged in newly revealed internal communications. The loophole, arising from a clause in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), enabled many companies to avoid disclosing releases of toxic...

Trump administration officials barred experts from warning legislators that they were about to write a major environmental loophole into law, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staffers alleged in newly revealed internal communications.  

The loophole, arising from a clause in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), enabled many companies to avoid disclosing releases of toxic “forever chemicals” to the EPA. 

Internal EPA correspondence obtained by The Hill shows that career staff members attempted to make Congress aware of the issue, but they believe their efforts were rebuffed by political appointees. 

One employee lamented that career staff “had tried to tell” the Senate about the problem, but he could not get approval to do so.   

The clause at issue, written by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (SEPW), said on Jan. 1, 2020, some of the chemicals — also known as PFAS — must be included in the EPA’s reporting database for toxic chemical releases: the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).   

But while the clause specified an annual reporting threshold for the compounds, it did not indicate whether Congress intended to deem them “chemicals of special concern,” as opposed to the baseline “standard chemical” label.   

Without the stricter designation, polluters could hide their discharges under an exemption intended for chemicals released in small proportions, called “de minimis” concentrations. 

Some EPA experts wanted to point this out to Senate staffers but said they were blocked from doing so.  

In August 2019, EPA career official David Turk wrote that his team "noticed some nuances that we had not considered previously that might be worth raising to [Senate] staff." 

Turk, head of the data-gathering and analysis division within the EPA’s Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics (OPPT), expressed concern that under the NDAA as drafted, companies would be able to get out of reporting their PFAS discharges if they only made up a small percentage of the total discharge.  

"Note that in contacting SEPW staff, we do not plan to take a position on this issue, but rather would like to convey a consideration that we had failed to raise previously," Turk wrote. 

His colleague Daniel Bushman, who at the time served as TRI petitions coordinator and chemical list manager, added that "the fix could be as simple as the bill just saying to add PFAS to the list of chemicals of special concern with a 100 pound reporting threshold." 

Known for their persistence in the body and the environment, PFAS, or per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, have been linked to cancers and other serious illnesses. They are present in household items such as nonstick pans, cosmetics and waterproof apparel, and in certain types of firefighting foam. 

With no direction otherwise from the NDAA, the EPA’s toxics branch codified 172 types of PFAS as standard chemicals and thereby opened the reporting loophole — publishing an initial version of the rule in May 2020 and finalizing it a month later.  

Under this classification, if levels of PFOA, a particularly toxic type of PFAS, constituted less than 0.1 percent of a given mixture, or if those of the other 171 kinds of the toxic compounds were below 1 percent, sites would be exempt from disclosing their discharge. Given that even unsafe levels of PFAS generally occur in comparatively tiny quantities, the classification meant that hardly any facilities would need to file a report.  

Bureaucratic breakdown 

EPA experts from the Toxics Release Inventory Program had recognized the problem nearly a year before — but found themselves talking to a brick wall built by the Trump administration, according to the internal correspondence.  

The experts recalled trying to inform the Senate committee that the language they were incorporating would not likely lead to stricter PFAS release reporting.  

But these messages apparently never reached their intended recipients. 

“Starting in late July 2019 we became aware of this issue and tried to raise it with Michal on multiple occasions,” Turk wrote in a June 10, 2020, email chain. 

Turk was referring to Michal Freedhoff, who at the time served as minority director of oversight — a Democratic staffer — for the Senate committee.  

That same day in 2020, Turk made similar remarks to another colleague, Stephanie Griffin, noting that "SEPW staff is pissed that we didn’t tell them about the whole chemicals of special concern issue.”  

"We had tried to tell them,” he continued. "It’s all very awkward.” 

Asked by Griffin where the breakdown in communication occurred, Turk said that it was “initially, Mark Hartman. And then Nancy Beck.”  

Mark Hartman, the OPPT’s deputy director of programs, is a career official. Nancy Beck was a Trump appointee who served as deputy and then principal deputy assistant administrator of the EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention (OCSPP), which houses the OPPT. Prior to taking on the EPA role, Beck worked for five years as an executive at the American Chemistry Council, a chemical industry lobbying group.     

In his exchange with Griffin, Turk then recounted a situation in which he and his colleagues were blocked from sharing the issue with the Senate committee. 

“Then we finally did get approval to include it in materials to send to Nancy that she might then send to SEPW, which we knew she wouldn’t send to them,” Turk added. 

The “awkwardness” Turk referred to stemmed from an email sent earlier that day from Freedhoff to Sven-Erik Kaiser of the EPA’s Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations, expressing shock that the May prepublication labeled PFAS as standard chemicals. The designation, she noted, could make PFAS “eligible for the de minimis concentration exemption.” 

“To get around TRI reporting for a listed PFAS chemical, all one would need to do is dilute the 100 lbs in 10,000 lbs of something else,” Freedhoff wrote. “This is not what Congress intended — we intended for reporting to occur for all releases that exceeded 100 lbs.” 

She stressed that the purpose of the NDAA clause “was certainly NOT to allow an entity to avoid reporting in the first place.”   

A significant portion of the June 11 communications among Turk and his colleagues were redacted under Freedom of Information Act procedures. But one visible portion affirmed Freedhoff’s assertions that EPA staffers never warned her that the NDAA language could prevent PFAS from being listed as chemicals of special concern.  

“We did not have direct interactions with Michal and did not control the delivery of information to Michal,” Turk added. “It appears that our messages on the topic never did reach her.”  

Slipping through the cracks 

Correspondence from 2019 shows that career EPA staffers made multiple attempts to warn Freedhoff about the loophole. 

Kaiser, a career official at the agency, initially expressed confidence to her that the clause would do what lawmakers wanted. In a June 17, 2019, email to Kaiser about the clause in question, Freedhoff asked whether "this does what it needs to do." Kaiser responded that the EPA believed the "language achieves the drafters' intent."  

But less than a month later — on July 10, 2019 — Bushman, the TRI petition coordinator, noted that the draft "does not classify PFAS as chemicals of special concern.”  

Bushman expressed concern that facilities would be able to claim that they stayed below the annual reporting thresholds, which he said “defeats the idea of having 100 lb reporting threshold to capture small quantities."  

Turk echoed Bushman's comments, also noting on July 10, 2019, that the reporting loophole "would put a [serious] damper on the utility of the TRI data." 

A few weeks later, on Aug. 6, Turk wrote to several staff members and Hartman, the OPPT’s deputy director of programs, warning that under the NDAA draft as written, companies would be able to “use the de minimis exemption, which could result in the loss of reporting."  

Turk expressed similar unease on Sept. 12, 2019, alerting Kaiser that the TRI/OPPT team had generated technical assistance "when Nancy reached out for info," but that "it was unclear" whether the EPA was "also providing that document to SEPW staff."  

Turk asked Kaiser if it "would be inappropriate to share” the special concern details with Freedhoff. Kaiser said he would "see if there's an opportunity,” but that he thought they had previously raised the matter and that Senate staff “weren't in position to address it at the time." 

Turk emphasized that he had only recognized this "nuance" recently — meaning that if his message was not conveyed alongside the technical data Beck had requested, then EPA staff would have "never raised it" to SEPW, as they "wouldn't have known to do so." 

A week later, on Sept. 19, Turk once again informed his colleagues that he was uncertain as to whether the EPA team ever delivered the message to SEPW.  

"I believe it went to Nancy Beck, but I don't know if it went to SEPW," Turk said.  

To this, longtime career staffer Tala Henry, then deputy director of OPPT, responded, "I don't think we can raise other issues," adding that this "specific request is late in the game." 

Asked by email why she might have deemed the request "too late in the game," Henry, who no longer works at the EPA, stressed that she had not reviewed the correspondence, which was available due to a Freedom of Information Act request.  

But based on her memory of the internal EPA exchanges, she said she recalled that "the TRI team had already provided the technical assistance requested by SEPW."  

This process, Henry continued, occurred "with all requisite clearance by EPA Office of General Counsel and political leadership and coordination clearance through EPAs Office of Congressional Affairs." 

"The legislation (part of the NDAA) was imminent," she added. 

An outcome ‘of maximum awkwardness’ 

Nine months after the September 2019 internal EPA communications, in June 2020, it became clear Freedhoff and her SEPW team had never received the information about the loophole that agency staffers had tried to convey.  

On June 9, Turk reported in an email to his colleagues that he had done "a little researching of [his] inbox" and indicated his concern that the career staffers' message had not been relayed to the committee, despite Kaiser recalling in a past exchange with Turk that it had been. 

“I don’t believe that we had yet presented this topic to him as something to share with SEPW, for at the OPPT or OCSPP level it kept getting stripped,” Turk wrote.  

By this time, the EPA had issued its rule codifying PFAS as a standard chemical.  

In Freedhoff’s June 10 email expressing shock about the classification, originally sent to Kaiser, she asked whether the EPA could withdraw the rule prior to its official publication and launch a notice and comment process to allow her colleagues “to describe their intent in writing.” 

As the email spread among EPA staffers that day, Turk told Griffin, an OPPT team lead, that Freedhoff had asked “to pull the final rule because it doesn’t reflect their intent.”  

Reiterating how he and his team had anticipated this outcome the summer before, Turk stressed that they “had discussed that SEPW would be upset when they learned that we didn’t tell them of this issue, which was one of the reasons we had tried to tell them of it.” 

At around the same time, Turk told Bushman, the TRI petition coordinator, that he was “not looking forward to the ‘discussion’ with Michal.”  

“It’s not like we can be open/honest with her given that we had wanted to convey all of this to her but we hadn’t been able to do so,” he continued. “‘You got it wrong, we realized that you got it wrong, and we never told you,’ also isn’t a viable discussion.” 

“I suppose we can point to Nancy Beck. But, even that, seems fishy,” Turk added.  

Bushman agreed, though he said he was reluctant “to take the heat for management’s unwillingness to let them know that what they were writing was not going to get them what they wanted.”  

But he surmised that nothing could be done about the situation at the time, adding that “if the Admin changes then next year we could likely address it.” 

Asked about the accusations lodged against her by the EPA staffers, Beck, who is today director of regulatory science at the law firm Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, said that she did not have time to delve into all the correspondence.  

Beck noted, however, that in January 2019, Alexandra Dunn became the Senate-confirmed assistant administrator of the OCSPP — the position directly above her.  

“She was the decision maker, not me,” Beck wrote in an email, adding that she “went on a detail” to the National Economic Council in June 2019. “Perhaps Alex has a recollection of this issue and can discuss it with you.” 

The Hill has reached out to Dunn, who is now the president and CEO of agrochemicals group CropLife America, for comment. 

As Turk and Bushman wrote back and forth on that June 10, 2020, evening, the former suggested how interesting it would be “if the admin changes and Michal joins the EPA,” predicting “the most ridiculous outcome in terms of maximum awkwardness.” 

Whether Turk was joking or serious, this is at least in part what happened. Freedhoff assumed Beck’s former role in January 2021 and received Senate confirmation to lead the OCSPP later that year.   

A reversal — and a ‘re-reversal’ 

Two days after Turk and Bushman’s June 10 banter, it became clear in the email correspondence that the TRI Program Division was preparing for a potential about-face — to possibly list the 172 PFAS as chemicals of special concern.   

“At this point, it appears that the NDAA listing rule will now indicate that the NDAA-added PFAS will be listed as ‘chemicals of special concern,’” Turk wrote to colleagues on the morning of Friday, June 12, warning that they “are not notifying anyone of this change.”  

But just three days later, on Monday, Turk said he was “not sure what’s happening,” adding that his team was “in a momentary holding pattern.” And by Wednesday, Turk wrote that “the rule is going out as originally intended, in alignment with the prepublication version.”  

Responding to what Turk described as a “re-reversal,” Bushman voiced suspicions that this was "due to conversation with the administrator and possibly some feedback from industry if someone reached out.”  

The team reverted back to the prepublication version of the rule, finalizing the text on June 22, 2020, and leaving the 172 PFAS, for the time being, in the standard chemical category.  

In the hands of ‘political leadership’  

Freedhoff, Turk and Bushman ended up being correct in their projections that the June 2020 standard chemical listing would lead to minimal PFAS reporting.   

In the aftermath of the rule’s implementation, the EPA revealed that during the first year of reporting — for 2020 — the nation’s facilities managed 800,000 pounds of PFAS in 2020 but only disclosed 9,000 pounds as releases. 

Following the transition from a Trump to Biden administration and with Freedhoff at the helm, the OCSPP and OPPT did ultimately decide to categorize 189 types of PFAS as chemicals of special concern more than two years after the loophole was opened.  

The agency proposed the new rule in December 2022 and finalized it in October 2023 — scrapping the de minimis exemption and making it much harder to avoid reporting releases.  

While the stricter designation will apply to submissions in reporting year 2024, industry can follow the standard chemical rules for their 2023 filings, which are due by July 1, 2024, according to the EPA

Environmental advocates worry the shift will be too little, too late.   

Nathan Saunders, a Maine environmental health official who first urged The Hill to look into the correspondence, stressed just how damaging the postponement could be for communities affected by PFAS. 

“The whole U.S. population was delayed from knowing PFAS release for four years,” said Saunders, who manages the Radiation Control Program in Maine’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention and delved into the issue after massive amounts of PFAS were detected on his property.  

Saunders blamed the setback on what he described as a “conscious identification of PFAS chemicals as standard chemicals.”  

That conscious decision, he added, occurred “at the expense of public health and to the benefit of the corporate profits." 

Responding to a long list of questions about the internal haggling that informed TRI-related decisions, EPA press secretary Remmington Belford said in an emailed statement that Freedhoff, in her prior role at the SEPW, had “worked closely with EPA career staff” as her committee drafted the clause that would add the 100-pound reporting threshold.  

Noting that the threshold was discussed on multiple occasions, Belford stressed that “at no time before the law was enacted” was Freedhoff told that lowering the threshold would be insufficient to eliminate the de minimis exemption — and would therefore not ensure “that the transparency objectives of the legislation would be met.” 

Once she understood the truth, Freedhoff “did attempt to get EPA to change course,” according to Belford. After the law was enacted, she learned from EPA career staff “that political leadership in the previous administration did not allow [them] to present Congress with additional technical assistance” that would have explained the de minimis issue, he added.  

Belford did acknowledge, however, that there was some initial confusion among EPA staff members. The confusion arose from the fact that to date, the only TRI chemicals assigned such thresholds were those in the “special concern” umbrella, he noted.   

“Certain EPA career staff members wanted to clarify for Senate staff that if their intent was to designate the TRI-added PFAS as ‘chemicals of special concern,’ the text as written would not accomplish this intent,” Beck confirmed.  

Asked specifically whether Beck or Hartman — who still works at the EPA — was responsible for blocking the message, Belford responded that “some of the people involved with the technical assistance for the 2020 NDAA are no longer with the agency.” 

The understanding of OCSPP career managers, Belford explained, is that “the previous administration’s political appointees opted not to share” information about the exemption with SEPW staff. 

“This understanding is consistent with what Dr. Freedhoff was told at the time by EPA career staff — this decision was not made by EPA career staff or managers,” he continued.  

“EPA, like all federal agencies, includes both career civil servants hired through a competitive process and political appointees appointed by the President,” Belford said. “Ultimately, EPA career staff members (including senior career managers) are led by political appointees and are obligated to follow the direction they are provided.” 

Asked if industry interests influenced the chemicals’ standard designation, as Bushman suggested in internal correspondence, Belford said that “industry did not contact career staff working in EPA’s TRI program to lobby, pressure or express their preferences regarding the text of the 2020 NDAA or its implementation.”  

“EPA is not aware of whether industry contacted the political leadership of the agency that was in place at that time,” he added, reiterating that “EPA career staff are required to follow the direction of the political leadership.” 

Once President Biden took office, Belford said “it was an immediate priority” for both the administration and EPA career staff to designate the TRI-listed PFAS as chemicals of special concern — a decision he in part attributed to Freedhoff, who joined the OCSPP in January 2021. 

“In Dr. Freedhoff’s view, this was always the intent of Congress in passing the NDAA,” Belford added. 

Read the full story here.
Photos courtesy of

What caused the massive El Segundo explosion? Refinery experts have some theories

Although refinery fires are not unheard of, industry experts say the sheer scale of the El Segundo fire last week raises concerns about what went wrong and requires a thorough investigation.

The focus of the investigation into what caused a massive explosion and fire last week at Chevron’s El Segundo plant has turned to a jet fuel processing unit in the southeast corner of the sprawling oil refinery. Chevron officials have said little about what caused the blast but confirmed the Isomax unit, which converts oil into higher-value products such as jet fuel, remains shuttered since the inferno even as other refinery operations continue. “Until we can figure out everything that happened here and make sure it doesn’t happen again, we won’t restart it,” said Ross Allen, a Chevron spokesperson, adding that the refinery continues to produce jet fuel, as well as gasoline and diesel, from other units. Although refinery fires are not unheard of — Chevron’s on-site firefighting team specifically prepares for them — industry experts say the sheer scale of the El Segundo fire last week raises concerns about what went wrong and requires a thorough investigation. The blast turned the night skies across the South Bay bright orange and sent out a roar that reverberated for miles. No one died in the incident, and damage was confined to the refinery’s footprint. Only a few workers have reported minor injuries. “I think Chevron has been extremely, extremely lucky ... [given] the size of the explosion here,” said Najmedin Meshkati, a professor of engineering at USC who has served as an expert for the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board as it has probed other major refinery fires.Meshkati and several other experts interviewed by The Times said it was still hard to know exactly what led to the El Segundo fire that night as few details have been shared by local or Chevron investigators, but there are some likely culprits. Andrew Lipow, president of Houston-based consulting firm Lipow Oil Associates, said that, in his experience, refinery fires can often be traced to equipment failures, especially those that lead to a situation that “allows hot oil and gas to reach the atmosphere.” “It finds an ignition source, and a fire results,” Lipow said. An error from the refinery’s oil sensors could lead to a larger system failure, which can end in major flames, according to Faisal Khan, director of the Texas-based Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, which provides training and education related to chemical safety. Oil sensors — which monitor well conditions and measure pressure, temperature and flow rates — have been used for a long time. But in the last decade, the technology has advanced to the point where there can be an over-reliance on the data, Khan said. That can lead to issues when refineries don’t have a backup mechanism to track the information or a person who can double-check the updates, he said. And once such a fire breaks out, it is particularly hard to fight because of how readily available fuel is within a refinery, said Casey Snow, El Segundo Fire Department division chief. The Fire Department trains to isolate and extinguish these types of fires by “controlling the valves that can restrict the flow” of the fuel, Snow said. It also will use water to try to limit where the active fire could spread. Neither Chevron nor state and local investigators have provided details on how widespread the fire became Thursday and Friday in El Segundo. Even though destruction wasn’t obvious from outside the refinery, Lipow said there was probably still significant damage. With a fire that size, the heat alone can melt equipment, and there could be direct fire damage even if it’s not clear to someone looking at the refinery from the outside, he said. “You can have a fire start at one part of the refinery … and it spreads because there’s just so much intense heat that it causes failures of other pieces of equipment nearby,” Lipow said.But there is often less dramatic damage to infrastructure — even for the scale of the fire — because these refinery fires are mostly burning fuel. “Typically, what you see burning is the fuel inside of the unit and not the structure itself,” said Allen, the Chevron spokesperson. “In many cases, firefighters use water to douse and cool nearby structures to keep the fire from spreading further. This minimizes additional damage to the facilities.”But downplaying the scope of this fire is not helpful, said Meshkati, the USC engineering professor. He said he hopes officials investigating this fire look for a “confluence of three sets of contributing factors,” which he separates into human-related, organizational and technological factors. A human factor can be something like an operator error; organizational factors are problems that stem from corporate decisions, such as not providing enough training or staffing; and technological factors are equipment failures, such as corrosion, he said. In the 2015 explosion at the then-Exxon Mobil Corp.’s Torrance refinery, federal investigators found a combination of organizational and technological issues caused the major blast.“We need to look at each one of those three sets of factors and then to the interaction of those factors,” Meshkati said. Meshkati’s main concern is that the investigation into this fire may not end up being as thorough and stringent as it could be, especially if the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board isn’t fully funded or staffed, as is now the case — a situation that has worried some locals and environmental groups. “We have not heard or seen from the Chemical Safety Board, which is the premier accident investigator for refineries in the United States,” Meshkati said. “This is, I think, a travesty.”An inquiry from The Times to the federal chemical board received an automatic out-of-office reply, citing the federal government shutdown. The Trump administration has also proposed budget cuts that would defund the board. But there are already several other investigations into the fire. Chevron officials said the company is working on its own probe, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District will look into potential violations of air quality rules and permit conditions. The California Department of Industrial Relations, which includes the Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management Unit, has also opened an investigation into the refinery fire, conducting thorough investigations to determine the cause of incidents and whether any state safety standards were violated. It wasn’t immediately clear when those findings would be ready, but Chevron is required to submit a report to the air quality district within 30 days analyzing potential causes and equipment breakdowns. Allen, the Chevron spokesperson, did not respond to a questions about the federal chemical board’s role or a possible timeline for Chevron’s findings from its investigation. Local authorities reported no injuries after the explosion. But as of Tuesday, four workers have claimed they were harmed in the incident, according to a lawsuit filed in Texas. One of their attorneys, Victoria Alford, said they were injured while they fled the massive explosion, calling the plant workers’ physical injuries “orthopedic in nature,” and said they were also suffering from anxiety.

UN plastics treaty chair to step down with process in turmoil

Exclusive: Luis Vayas Valdivieso says he is quitting for personal and professional reasons after reports of pressure behind the scenesThe chair of stalled UN plastics treaty talks, Luis Vayas Valdivieso, is preparing to step down, after accounts of behind-the-scenes pressure from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).The move will be announced at a UN meeting on Tuesday, with an official announcement expected by Thursday. Vayas Valdivieso confirmed in an interview with the Guardian that he was resigning and said: “There have been some challenges in the process.” Continue reading...

The chair of stalled UN plastics treaty talks, Luis Vayas Valdivieso, is preparing to step down, after accounts of behind-the-scenes pressure from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).The move will be announced at a UN meeting on Tuesday, with an official announcement expected by Thursday. Vayas Valdivieso confirmed in an interview with the Guardian that he was resigning and said: “There have been some challenges in the process.”In August, global talks at the UN headquarters in Geneva to agree on a treaty to deal with accelerating plastic pollution collapsed after three years of negotiations. There is currently no deal and the future of the agreement is unclear.The chair’s sudden resignation leaves the plastic treaty in an even more uncertain position, and raises questions around the governance of the process.Vayas Valdivieso faced criticism from NGOs and member states during the latest stage of the talks for releasing a draft text, which was rejected by the majority of negotiators and described by the UK’s head of delegation, the minister Emma Hardy as the “lowest common denominator”. Ghana said the text would “entrench the status quo for decades to come”.A section on plastic production limits from a previous draft had been removed, and there was no mention of hazardous chemicals in plastics. Text about addressing plastic pollution across the “full life cycle” from a previous draft had also been taken out.A second text, which was described as marginally better but still criticised for not being ambitious enough, came too late for an agreement to be formed. It was also rejected as the basis for continuing talks.Vayas Valdivieso said he had stepped down for both personal and professional reasons. He defended his work, saying that the treaty process had so far “achieved very important goals”. He added that the much-criticised first draft was never intended, in his mind, to be the final version.While some have criticised the chair’s leadership, concerns have also been raised that his work has been obstructed by UNEP, which is headed by the executive director, Inger Andersen. Sources told the Guardian and others that UNEP staff, who are supposed to be impartial, held a covert meeting on the final night of the negotiations, intended to coax members of civil society groups into pressuring the chair to step down.“I was at the meeting and I found it to be very problematic,” one of those who attended told the Guardian. They added that they only discovered the meeting was about the alleged “dissatisfaction with the chair” once already in the room, and felt uncomfortable being there.In a letter seen by the Guardian and confirmed by Vayas Valdivieso, he lodged an inquiry with UNEP asking for information about the gathering “whose focus was the chair’s management” of the process.He asked UNEP to take “measures to prevent similar situations” and also called for more transparency in the negotiations overall, saying: “This is a member [state]-driven negotiation, and I’ve been defending that, and will defend that, until the last day of my chairpersonship.”skip past newsletter promotionThe planet's most important stories. Get all the week's environment news - the good, the bad and the essentialPrivacy Notice: Newsletters may contain information about charities, online ads, and content funded by outside parties. If you do not have an account, we will create a guest account for you on theguardian.com to send you this newsletter. You can complete full registration at any time. For more information about how we use your data see our Privacy Policy. We use Google reCaptcha to protect our website and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.after newsletter promotionHe told the Guardian that although he was sad, his resignation was also an opportunity to bring “new blood, new initiatives, new ideas for the process”. He added that his decision to step down had nothing to do with what unfolded at the talks in Geneva.The Guardian has also reported on how petrostates and well-funded plastic industry lobbyists have worked to derail a deal to cut plastic production.Christina Dixon, an ocean campaign leader at the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), described Vayas Valdivieso’s resignation as “a stark reminder of the dysfunction that has plagued the plastics treaty negotiations from the beginning”. She said trust in the process had to be urgently be restored if there was to be any hope of reaching a meaningful outcome.A UNEP spokesperson said: “While UNEP has not been formally informed by the chair he plans to step down, the executive director wishes to thank Luis Vayas Valdivieso for his tireless service as chair of the INC process.” Commenting on the informal gathering, UNEP said the executive director “was unaware of any meeting until it was brought to our attention. This matter is now being handled in accordance with UN rules and regulations.”

Chevron's El Segundo refinery has a history of safety and environmental violations

Over the last five years, Chevron's El Segundo refinery has 46 violations of environmental safety rules; over the last decade, it was also issued 17 OSHA violations.

The explosion and hours-long fire at Chevron’s refinery Thursday night in El Segundo deeply unnerved communities in the South Bay. The blast sent shock waves throughout the refinery grounds, allegedly injuring at least one worker, and jolting residents as far as a mile away. A 100-foot-tall pillar of fire cast an orange glow over the night sky. And towering plumes of smoke and acrid odors drifted eastward with the onshore winds.While local regulators are investigating the fire, environmental advocates lament that federal safety agencies likely won’t be joining in the effort to find the cause of Thursday’s explosion — perhaps preventing similar hazardous chemical releases in the future. The incident was one of the most perilous events in the refinery’s 114-year history, adding to a long list of environmental and safety violations, according to public records reviewed by The Times. Most staff at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the federal agency tasked with investigating workplace safety, is not working because of the ongoing federal shutdown. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Mitigation Board, which determines root causes from dangerous chemical releases, is also furloughed and could lose its funding because of proposed budget cuts by the Trump administration. “The Trump administration has defunded the Chemical Safety board, and the federal government is shut down right now,” said Joe Lyou, a resident of nearby Hawthorne and president of the Coalition for Clean Air, a statewide nonprofit. “So there is a very good possibility we are never going to know what really caused this, because the experts in figuring this stuff out are no longer there to do that.”Without clear answers, labor unions are fearful that a similar disaster could endanger thousands of workers at California’s 15 refineries, which are mostly clustered in Southern California and the Bay Area. “Companies are making billions in profits and still are making it nearly impossible to make sure we’re safe from terrible disasters,” said Joe Uehlein, board president of the Labor Network for Sustainability. “In California, we’ve seen horrific injuries to workers and tens of thousands of residents have had to seek medical attention in refinery accidents. This time, we got lucky.”The Chemical Safety Board has identified causes of scores of refinery incidents over its history, including the 2015 explosion at the ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance that injured at least two workers.In that incident, the board’s investigation found multiple safety failures, including a severely eroded safety valve that allowed flammable gases to dangerously seep into unwanted areas. The board also discovered that a large piece of debris almost struck a tank of hydrofluoric acid, which could have resulted in a deadly release of the highly toxic chemical, leading to pressure to cease using the chemical.But, for the Chevron refinery explosion, there is no guarantee such an investigation will take place. The Trump administration proposed eliminating the budget for the Chemical Safety Board this fiscal year, starting Oct. 1, sunsetting the 27-year-old federal agency. Environmental advocates say that is a mistake. “They’re undermining our ability to prevent these accidents by taking away the accountability mechanisms in the federal government,” said Lyou. “That’s a huge concern. It’s not politics. Democrats and Republicans live around the Chevron refinery, and they both want to make sure that the refinery is operating safely.”In the absence of federal regulators, the South Coast Air Quality Management District is investigating potential violations of air quality rules and permit conditions. The refinery will also be required to submit a report analyzing potential causes and equipment breakdowns within 30 days.So far, the air district has said the fire originated in the refinery’s ISOMAX hydocracking unit, which uses hydrogen to refine oil into jet fuel and diesel. The refinery’s air monitors detected a spike in airborne chemicals after the fire broke out, but air district officials say conditions returned to normal levels after a few hours. Environmental advocates say the extent of the fallout may not be known until there is a larger examination of air quality monitors. “I was very surprised that the air district reported they weren’t seeing terribly high levels of pollution,” said Julia May, senior scientist for California-based nonprofit Communities for a Better Environment. “Sometimes in a big refinery fire like this, it goes straight up. But then the smoke comes down in other areas. And that’s a lot of pollution that’s going someplace.”The Chevron facility had been cited numerous times for environmental and safety violations, according to local and federal records. The South Coast Air Quality Management District has issued 13 notices of violations over the last 12 months, and 46 in the last five years. Most recently, on Sept. 22, the air district cited the facility for a large chemical leak and failing to keep its equipment in proper working condition. In August, Chevron representatives had also asked the air district for leniency in assessing compliance with air quality rules while it was working to remove unwanted buildup inside its furnace tubes — conditions that they said risked equipment overheating and potentially failing. OSHA records show the agency conducted at least 15 inspections at the Chevron refinery in El Segundo over the last decade, identifying 17 violations.In September 2023, OSHA issued citations related to heat illness prevention requirements, ladderway guardrails and a failure to conduct a thorough hazard analysis — an internal assessment intended to control fires, explosions and chemical releases.In October 2022, after conducting a planned inspection of the Chevron refinery, OSHA records show the agency identified a “serious” violation of an agency standard requiring employers to “develop, implement and maintain safe work practices to prevent or control hazards,” such as leaks, spills, releases and discharges; and control over entry into hazardous work areas.” During the government shutdown, it’s unclear if OSHA’s pared-down staff will be investigating Thursday’s refinery fire. An OSHA media office phone number went straight to a recorded message stating that the line is not being monitored and “due to a loss of funding, certain government activities have been suspended and I’m unable to respond to your message at this time.”For some environmentalists, the Chevron refinery fire has underscored why it’s necessary to transition away from fossil fuels altogether.“They [the refineries] have great workers and great fire departments to respond, but this is an inherently dangerous operation that handles hundreds of thousands of barrels per day of flammable explosive materials under high temperature and high pressure,” said May, the senior scientist for Communities for a Better Environment. “When something goes wrong, you can have a runaway fire. They did a great job at getting it under control. But do we really want antiquated dirty energy in our communities?”

California governor under pressure over bill to ban cookware made with Pfas

Gavin Newsom, who has vetoed environmental bills before, feeling push from industry and celebrity chefs on next stepsGavin Newsom, the California governor, is facing intense pressure from industry, and even some celebrity chefs, as he weighs whether or not to sign a bill that bans the sale of cookware made with Pfas or “forever chemicals”.The legislation, approved by the California legislature on 12 September, comes as Newsom contemplates a run for the Democratic presidential nomination, heightening the scrutiny of his decision. Continue reading...

Gavin Newsom, the California governor, is facing intense pressure from industry, and even some celebrity chefs, as he weighs whether or not to sign a bill that bans the sale of cookware made with Pfas or “forever chemicals”.The legislation, approved by the California legislature on 12 September, comes as Newsom contemplates a run for the Democratic presidential nomination, heightening the scrutiny of his decision.The industry pressure is part of a broader attack that aims to derail similar bans on Pfas in cookware in other states, public health advocates say. Newsom has a history of vetoing some environmental bills around toxic chemicals, including a ban on Pfas in household cleaners and artificial turf that were made amid similar industry pressure. But advocates say they have worked with the administration to address concerns.“Industry is putting so much pressure on Newsom, and they’re doing it in the press, scaring the public and high profile people are writing to him saying the sky will fall,” said Andria Ventura, legislative director for Clean Water Action, which has lobbied for the bills. “We’re not sure where he’ll land on this.”Newsom’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment. He has until 13 October to veto the bill.Pfas are a class of about 16,000 chemicals most frequently used to make products water-, stain- and grease-resistant. The compounds have been linked to cancer, birth defects, decreased immunity, high cholesterol, kidney disease and a range of other serious health problems. They are dubbed “forever chemicals” because they do not naturally break down in the environment.The Cookware Sustainability Alliance, a trade group founded by two of the world’s largest cookware manufacturers, Groupe SEB and Meyer, is leading the charge against the ban. Steve Burns, a lobbyist from the group, said he is particularly concerned about restaurants that use Pfas throughout the kitchen.“Some of the top chefs in the nation rely on nonstick,” he said. “They need this in their restaurants.”Burns claimed butter and oil used in pans is more unhealthy than Ptfe exposure and said the cookware industry is unfairly maligned because it did not create the chemicals.“We’re two steps removed yet we’re the ones who are being held accountable,” Burns said.Chefs who have come out in opposition to the bill include Thomas Keller, David Chang and Rachael Ray – each has had cookware lines that could take a financial hit from the ban. That has drawn criticism from actor and anti-Pfas activist Mark Ruffalo, who supports the ban.The state’s legislature is the seventh to pass a ban on the sale of Pfas in cookware, and is part of a package that would prohibit the chemicals’ use in six product categories. State legislatures across the US have proposed hundreds of limits on Pfas’s use in consumer goods in recent years, which is pressuring companies to move away from the often dangerous chemicals in non-essential uses.“These are avoidable uses of Pfas that we can eliminate now,” said Avi Kar, senior director of the toxics program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, which is lobbying in support of the bill. “Pfas is such a large problem and we need to do everything we can to reduce exposures. This is a clear cut case, and there are already alternatives, so it’s not going to cause hardship.”Advocates say they worked with industry in other product categories but only cookware makers were hostile toward legislation. The industry previously sued in federal court in an attempt to overturn a similar ban in Minnesota, but the suit was dismissed.skip past newsletter promotionSign up to Detox Your KitchenA seven-week expert course to help you avoid chemicals in your food and groceries.Privacy Notice: Newsletters may contain information about charities, online ads, and content funded by outside parties. If you do not have an account, we will create a guest account for you on theguardian.com to send you this newsletter. You can complete full registration at any time. For more information about how we use your data see our Privacy Policy. We use Google reCaptcha to protect our website and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.after newsletter promotionSimilar tactics and claims are being deployed in California. Industry has said, without providing firm evidence, that the bans caused cookware shortages on store shelves. Maine was among the first states to ban Pfas in cookware and the industry has claimed brides in the state are upset because they can’t get Teflon pans on their registries, advocates say.Pfas compounds like Ptfe, also called Teflon, are most commonly used in pans and industry has claimed the chemical is safe and should not be classified as a Pfas. New Mexico exempted Ptfe from its cookware ban, but most governments classify it as a Pfas and regulate it. While science suggests Ptfe poses less of a health threat in isolation than other more dangerous Pfas, some peer-reviewed research highlights risks throughout its life cycle.Highly toxic Pfas are used to manufacture Ptfe, and the former can end up in the environment or leftover on a pan. When Ptfe cookware is scratched or chipped, it can shed micro- or nanoplastics into food. Research has linked Ptfe in combination with other microplastics to decreased sperm quality, among other health issues, and Ptfe fumes emitted from a pan can cause flu-like symptoms.Ventura noted the California water and sewer utility trade group endorses the ban because utilities are left with the cost of trying to remove PFAS pollution from drinking water.Industry has also run ads in California claiming the state is in a cost-of-living crisis, and the ban would force families to spend more than $300 buying new pots and pans. In one ad that ran on Instagram, a woman standing in a kitchen states that she can’t afford to buy new pans.But Ventura noted the ban only covers selling new cookware with Pfas and wouldn’t prohibit owning the products or buying them out of state. Though industry claims alternatives are more expensive, most companies also make stainless steel, cast iron or nonstick ceramic products, and many are the same price.“All you have to do is walk into a Marshalls or Macy’s and you can see they’re the same price, and the companies are making the alternatives,” Ventura said. “Nobody is going to go into your house or the kitchen of your restaurant and take away [the Teflon pans].”

Industrial Chemical Linked To Parkinson's Disease

By Dennis Thompson HealthDay ReporterTHURSDAY, Oct. 2, 2025 (HealthDay News) — Long-term exposure to a chemical used in metal degreasing and dry...

By Dennis Thompson HealthDay ReporterTHURSDAY, Oct. 2, 2025 (HealthDay News) — Long-term exposure to a chemical used in metal degreasing and dry cleaning might increase the risk of Parkinson’s disease, a new study says.Seniors living in places with the highest airborne levels of trichloroethylene showed a 10% higher risk for Parkinson’s than those in areas with the lowest levels, researchers report in the journal Neurology.Further, risk of Parkinson’s increased fourfold for people living one to five miles downwind of an Oregon factory that used the chemical, researchers found.“Long-term exposure to trichloroethylene in outdoor air was associated with a small but measurable increase in Parkinson’s risk,” said lead researcher Brittany Krzyzanowski, an assistant professor at the Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix.“These findings add to a growing body of evidence that environmental exposures may contribute to Parkinson’s disease,” she said in a news release.Trichloroethylene (TCE) is known to cause kidney cancer, and studies have linked the chemical to blood cancers and liver cancer, according to the National Cancer Institute.It’s a persistent environmental pollutant in air, water and soil across the United States, researchers noted. A 2000 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) report estimated that up to 30% of the nation’s drinking water supplies were contaminated with TCE. In 2024, the EPA issued a ban on the chemical for all consumer and commercial uses that was set to start in 2025. However, the ban was stayed pending a legal challenge, and the chemical remains in use.For the new study, researchers used Medicare data to identify seniors older than 67 newly diagnosed with Parkinson’s between 2016 and 2018, and compared each participant to five other seniors who didn’t have the disease.Parkinson’s occurs when brain cells that produce the neurotransmitter dopamine either die or become impaired. When that happens, people start to have movement problems that include shaking, stiffness, and difficulty with balance and coordination, according to Cleveland Clinic.All told, the study included nearly 222,000 people with Parkinson’s and more than 1.1 million people without the disease, researchers said.Using ZIP codes and EPA data, researchers mapped everyone’s exposure to outdoor TCE concentrations two years prior to their diagnosis.Researchers concluded that people exposed to the highest levels of TCE appeared to have a greater risk of Parkinson’s, after controlling for other risk factors for the disorder.“While the increased risk was modest, the sheer number of people exposed to TCE in the environment means the potential public health impact could be substantial,” Krzyzanowski said.The team also identified several geographic “hot spots” where outdoor TCE levels were highest, particularly in the Rust Belt region, as well as three facilities that operated as the nation’s top TCE-emitting facilities in 2002.Results showed that Parkinson’s risk was higher close to two of the three facilities. At one of those sites, Parkinson’s risk clearly rose the closer people lived to the facility. People living one to five miles downwind from a lithium battery plant in Lebanon, Oregon, had a more than four times greater risk of Parkinson’s than those living up to 10 miles away.“This underscores the need for stronger regulations and more monitoring of industrial pollutants,” Krzyzanowski said.The researchers noted that their study could not draw a direct cause-and-effect link between TCE and Parkinson’s. Their results only show an association.However, previous reports have also linked TCE to Parkinson’s, researchers said.For example, TCE contamination of the drinking water at Camp Lejeune, a Marine Corps base in Jacksonville, N.C., has been linked with a 70% higher risk of Parkinson’s among service members stationed there.SOURCES: American Academy of Neurology, news release, Oct. 1, 2025; Neurology, Oct. 1, 2025Copyright © 2025 HealthDay. All rights reserved.

Suggested Viewing

Join us to forge
a sustainable future

Our team is always growing.
Become a partner, volunteer, sponsor, or intern today.
Let us know how you would like to get involved!

CONTACT US

sign up for our mailing list to stay informed on the latest films and environmental headlines.

Subscribers receive a free day pass for streaming Cinema Verde.
Thank you! Your submission has been received!
Oops! Something went wrong while submitting the form.